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Mitch L. WerBell V 
 
In Martin v. United States, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed a 
Fifth Amendment regulatory takings and exaction claim for want of 
ripeness when the claimant failed to apply for a permit, which would have 
allowed for an assessment of the cost of compliance with governmentally 
imposed requirements. By finding the claim unripe, the court stood firm 
on the historical view that federal courts may only adjudicate land-use 
regulatory takings and inverse condemnation claims on the merits after a 
regulating entity has made a final decision. However, jurisprudential 
evolution of the ripeness doctrine and judicial review of takings claims 
may be forthcoming as the United States Supreme Court is set to deliver a 
decision in Knick v. Township of Scott. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Martin v. United States,1 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit evaluated the ripeness and unconstitutional conditions 
doctrines within the context of a takings claim.2 The lower court dismissed 
the claim for lack of jurisdiction because the claimants (“Inholders”) failed 
to show a physical occupation of their property by the defendant, the 
federal government (“Government”), sufficient to constitute a taking.3 
Additionally, with respect to a regulatory takings argument, the court 
found the Inholders’ claim was not ripe because they did not exhaust 
federal permitting processes.4 The Inholders failed to apply for the 
required permit to rebuild United States Forest Service (“USFS”) Roads 
89 and 268 (“Roads”) to access their property prior to filing suit; therefore, 
the USFS was not able to issue the requisite final decision necessary for 
the Inholders to assert a viable takings claim.5 The court relied on 
precedent to affirm that the claim was not ripe.6 As the court dismissed 
this case on ripeness grounds, the validity of the Inholders’ assertion of 
statutorily granted easements over the Roads remained unresolved.7  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
                                                     
1.  894 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. pending, No. 18-477. 
2. Id. at 1362–1365.  
3.  Id. at 1360. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6. Id. at 1363–1364. 
7. Id. at 1365–1366. The Inholders have petitioned for certiorari. See 
Pet. Writ Cert., Oct. 9, 2018, No. 18-477. 
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The Inholders owned mining and homestead claims within the 
Santa Fe National Forest.8 The 2011 Las Conchas Fire resulted in 
destruction of vegetation in the National Forest, and subsequent major 
flooding events significantly damaged the Roads which the Inholders used 
to access their claims.9 As a result of the flooding damage, the USFS 
notified the Inholders in September 2011 that the Roads were 
unnavigable.10 However, USFS stated it would give the Inholders “limited 
access.”11 The following April, the USFS informed the Inholders the 
agency decided to close public access to the Roads, citing safety 
concerns.12 Further, the USFS stated there was neither public need nor 
justification to use public funds to rebuild the Roads because of future 
flooding risks and ongoing instability of the surrounding terrain.13  
While deeming the Roads closed to the public, the USFS said “it 
would ‘continue to work with’ the Inholders and other private property 
owners to ensure they had ‘adequate and reasonable access’ to their inheld 
properties.”14 The Inholders responded by writing to the United States 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), claiming they already possessed 
statutorily granted right-of-way easements over the Roads and their wish 
was to imminently “utilize and repair” the Roads.15 The USDA disagreed 
but acknowledged the Inholders’ right to access their claims—“subject to 
reasonable regulations.”16 The USDA suggested the Inholders work with 
the USFS to rebuild the Roads because they could be subject to criminal 
and civil penalties if they failed to comply with federal laws governing 
entrance and exiting of federal lands.17  
The Inholders sued the Government in the Court of Federal 
Claims under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, alleging that the 
USFS did not acknowledge their easements and, by requiring an expensive 
permitting process to rebuild the Roads, the Government had effectively 
deprived the Inholders of access to their property.18 The Court of Federal 
Claims dismissed the complaint and found: (1) the Inholders insufficiently 
                                                     
8.  Martin, 894 F.3d at 1359 (citing Martin v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 
648, 650 (2017)). 
9.  Id.  
10.  Id. 
11.  Id.  
12.  Id.  
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. at 1359–1360. USFS suggested the neighbors should work 
together and that the agency would aid in “facilitat[ing] the creation of a formal road 
association, which would then be granted a recordable private road easement,” and 
presented two reconstruction options. Id. at 1359. 
15.  Id. at 1360 (relying on 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1866), repealed by Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 
2743, 2793). 
16.  Id. USDA asserted that under the Inholders’ cited law, “private 
citizens were not granted any ‘title interest in public roads.’” Id. 
17.  Id.  
18.  Id. The Inholders claimed the Government “physically seized [their] 
real property interest[s] under threat of civil and criminal prosecution.” Id. 
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pleaded a physical takings claim because there was no physical occupation 
of the property; and (2) the regulatory takings claim was not ripe due to 
the Inholders’ failure to apply for a permit to build the Roads.19 The 
Inholders appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.20 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Reviewing the case de novo,21 the court concluded that the Court 
of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over takings cases when the claim is 
not ripe.22 First, the court discussed the Takings Clause, which prohibits 
the government from seizing private property for public use without 
payment to the landowner.23 Second, the court briefly explored the 
underlying dispute around the Inholders’ asserted private easement over 
the Roads.24 Third, the court evaluated the Inholders’ alleged regulatory 
takings claim in the context of both ripeness and the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.25 Finally, in affirming the lower court’s 
decision for lack of ripeness, the court suggested an alternative 
adjudication mechanism using the Quiet Title Act,26  which would allow 
the Inholders to obtain a judicial determination on any ownership interests 
in the alleged easements.27 
 
A. The Takings Clause & Revised Statute 2477 Easements 
 
The court began with a brief discussion of Takings Clause 
jurisprudence.28 Citing Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,29 the court 
noted regulatory takings fall within the scope of the Takings Clause.30 The 
                                                     
19.  Id. (citing Martin, 131 Fed. Cl. at 652–653). The Court declined to 
address “whether the Inholders possess[ed] a ‘vested property right in the easements 
they allege are coextensive with [Forest Roads 89 and 268],’ because even assuming 
that they h[e]ld such a property right, ‘a claim for a regulatory taking is not ripe until 
a permit is both sought and denied.’” Id. 
20.  Id. at 1360, 1366. 
21.  Id. at 1360 (citing McGuire v. United States, 707 F.3d 1351, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
22. Id. (citing Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); Morris v. United States, 392 F.3d 1351, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
23.  Id. at 1361 (see U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 (“[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”)). 
24.  Id. at 1360–1362 (exploring 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976)). 
25.  Id. at 1362–1365. 
26.  28 U.S.C. § 2409a. 
27.  Martin, 894 F.3d. at 1365–1366. 
28.  Id. at 1361.  
29.  260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
30.  Martin, 894 F.3d. at 1361 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (“[A] regulation which denies all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land will require compensation under the Takings Clause.”)); see 
also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
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court cited the Nollan-Dolan nexus rule,31  as recently applied in Koontz 
v. St. Johns River Water Management District,32 to extend the Takings 
Clause to include land-use exactions, which requires an essential nexus 
and rough proportionality between the property the government requires 
for public dedication—as a condition of a land-use permit approval—and 
the social costs of the application.33 
Prior to addressing ripeness, the court commented on the legal 
background surrounding the Inholders’ claim that they held valid 
easements over the Roads.34 Under Revised Statute 247735—a repealed 
law which has since generated heated land-use fights in the Western 
United States36—the Inholders alleged that the Government decided “‘to 
treat [the Roads] as its sole property,’ and ha[d] prohibited them from 
repairing [the Roads] unless they ‘t[ook] on the enormous costs’ of 
obtaining a special use permit.”37 Revised Statute 2477 provided that “the 
right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not 
reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.”38 Indeed, the court noted that, 
as part of the “congressional pro-development lands policy,” Revised 
Statute 2477 rights-of-way “could be established with ‘no administrative 
formalities: no entry, no application, no license, no patent, and no deed on 
the federal side.’”39 However, the Government argued that Revised Statute 
2477 “did not confer any property rights on private parties,” but rather 
“authorized rights-of-way for the construction of public roads across 
unreserved federal lands,” and thus the Inholders did not hold any 
easements.40 The court declined to respond to the Inholders’ easement 
claim in the affirmative—leaving that issue for the Inholders to pursue 
through the Quiet Title Act or by appeal.41 
 
B.  Ripeness 
 
Noting that exercising judicial review on the merits requires a ripe 
claim, the court restated the basic test under the ripeness doctrine.42 A 
                                                     
31.  Martin, 894 F.3d. at 1361 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 538 (2005)). 
32.  570 U.S. 595, 605–606 (2013). 
33.  Martin, 894 F.3d at 1361. 
34.  Id. at 1361–1362. 
35.  43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976). 
36.  See Southern Utah Wilderness All. v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 
2005). 
37.  Martin, 894 F.3d at 1362. The Inholders also alleged a taking without 
just compensation occurred when the USFS required “them to ‘surrender’ their 
vested…easements in exchange for a permit that would enable them to repair [the 
Roads] and ‘allow them the full historical use of their patented mining properties.’” 
Id. 
38.  Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976)). 
39.  Id. (quoting Southern Utah Wilderness All., 425 F.3d at 741). 
40. Id. 
41.  Id. at 1362–1363, 1365. 
42.  Id. at 1362–1363. 
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claim is not ripe where it relies on “contingent future events,” occurrence 
of which is uncertain.43 Ripeness, as a judicial principle, prevents courts 
from entanglement in theoretical arguments by dodging untimely 
adjudication.44 The court then stated the particular ripeness rule which 
applied to this case—a regulating entity must issue a final decision on the 
application of governmental regulations to private property before the 
property owner can challenge the land-use regulation as a takings claim.45 
The court dismissed the notion that the Inholders’ failure to apply for a 
permit—for the purposes of ripeness— could be “excused as futile.”46 In 
fact, the court made clear the USFS recognized the Inholders’ right to 
adequately and reasonably access their properties and demonstrated 
willingness to work with the Inholders to secure such access.47 Also, under 
the narrow circumstances where a compensable taking may occur based 
on the “cost of complying with a valid regulatory process,” the court still 
deemed the Inholders’ claim “premature” because the Inholders’ actual 
cost of compliance with the permitting was not yet determined.48 The 
Inholders alleged the permitting would be “prohibitively expensive,” but 
the court found—with the threshold issue of timing—the claim warranted 
an understanding of the conditions upon which the permit would be 
granted, if at all.49 Finding the claim “abstract” and “conjectural” under 
Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States,50 the court held that the Inholders’ 
regulatory takings claim was not ripe because they had not yet employed 
the USFS permitting process.51 To be sure, the court relied on the principle 
that, to properly exercise judicial review, a judicial body must first know 
how far a regulation goes before it can find that a regulation went too far.52 
 
C.  The Regulatory Takings Claim 
 
Without determining the extent of the Inholders’ property 
interests, the court looked to the regulatory takings claim based on the 
“imposition of a special-use authorization requirement.”53 The 
Government argued judicial review was premature because the Inholders 
                                                     
43.  Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 
580–581 (1985)). 
44.  Martin, 894 F.3d at 1362 (citing Abbott Labs v. Gardener, 387 U.S. 
136, 148 (1967)). 
45.  Id. at 1363 (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618).   
46.  Id. at 1364 (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 622; Anaheim Gardens v. 
United States, 444 F.3d 1309, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
47.  Id.  
48.  Id. at 1363 (citing Morris, 392 F.3d at 1377). 
49.  Id.  
50.  177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
51.  Martin, 894 F.3d at 1363 (external citations omitted). 
52.  Id. (citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 
340, 248 (1986)). 
53.  Id. at 1362. 
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had not applied for the special use permit with the USFS to allow 
reconstruction and repair of the Roads.54  
Using Supreme Court precedent, the court recognized the 
continued applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which 
bars the government from conditioning a person’s receipt of a benefit to 
circumvent directly commanding the action.55 The court restated that, with 
respect to exactions jurisprudence, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine includes Fifth Amendment takings claims where a landowner 
applies for a land-use permit from the government.56 The court reiterated 
Koontz’s caveat—recognizing that private property owners seeking the 
government’s approval to develop their lands are particularly susceptible 
to abuses of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, given permitting 
authorities’ generally broad power.57 
The court briefly discussed the Inholders’ alternative argument 
that their claim was ripe for judicial review because of the ongoing 
controversy over the permitting process and their easement claims.58 
Based on the record, the court quickly dispelled this argument by ruling 
that the Government never indicated its grant of a permit to rebuild the 
Roads was conditioned upon the Inholders’ surrendering their claim of 
ownership over their alleged property rights.59 In fact, at oral argument, 
the Government stated that the “Inholders would not waive any ownership 
rights in Revised Statute 2477 easements by availing themselves of 
[USFS] special use permitting procedures.”60 The Government continued 
to assert Revised Statute 2477 never granted easements to private 
citizens.61  
The court quickly suggested the Quiet Title Act could be used to 
determine the extent of any ownership rights the Inholders had over the 
alleged easements.62 As a statutory circumvention of sovereign immunity, 
the Quiet Title Act allows for a quiet title suit where a plaintiff’s claim 
asserts conflicting “right, title, or interest” in land against the United 
States.63 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
                                                     
54.  Id. 
55. Id. at 1364 (quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
56. Id. (citing Koontz, 570 U.S. at 604; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 
483 U.S at 831–832). 
57. Id. (quoting Koontz, 570 U.S. at 605). 
58.  Id. at 1364–1365. The Inholders alleged “the [G]overnment has 
conditioned the grant of a permit to reconstruct [the Roads] on the ‘surrender’ of their 
alleged Revised Statute 2477 easements.” Id.  
59. Id. at 1365. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1364–1365 (citing Oral Arg. at 14:39–15:55, 
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov.mp3/2017-2224.mp3). 
62. Id. at 1365 (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2409a). 
63. Id. (citing Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 215 (2012)). 
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Martin v. United States highlighted important and countervailing 
principles in the land-use and regulatory takings sphere. On one hand, the 
court noted that governmental entities should exercise proper restraint to 
prevent possible coercion around conditions related to permitting. On the 
other hand, the court stressed the importance of proper judicial review by 
addressing the threshold issue of ripeness and avoiding entanglement in 
abstract, premature arguments. Insofar as federal courts are presently 
willing to dismiss similar premature claims where a claimant failed to 
submit to a permitting process or exhaust state court remedies, the 
Supreme Court may turn this practice upside down if they side with 
property rights advocates in Knick v. Township of Scott.64 
                                                     
64. 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138. S. Ct. 1262 (2018).  
